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LIBEL REFORM: AN APPRAISALt
C. Thomas Dienes*
Today, I am going to talk about the law of libel. A major part
of my work at U.S. News is prepublication review of U.S. News
and World Report and The Atlantic. I make difficult decisions
such as assessing the risk that the Ayatollah Khomeini might
sue the magazine for libel. I am not sure if you can libel the
Ayatollah, but be careful if you do-he has very potent reme-
dies.1 I will not focus on the law of libel as it is practiced in
Michigan or in other states today. Instead, I want to examine
proposals for the total restructuring of defamation law. Perhaps
in evaluating such proposed changes, we can better appreciate
the strengths and weaknesses of existing libel law.
In particular, I want to evaluate the Annenberg Project's pro-
posed Libel Reform Act. In the winter of 1987-88, Northwestern
University's Annenberg Program2 brought eleven persons to
Washington, D.C. to discuss libel reform. They held very differ-
t Originally delivered as the keynote address at a conference on "The Media and the
Law: New Legislation, Judicial Trends and Controversial Proposals for Reform," held at
Wayne State University, March 11, 1989. Co-sponsored by the Detroit Bar Association,
the Detroit Bar Foundation, the State Bar of Michigan and the Gannett Foundation, the
conference focused on media access to government processes and documents and on libel
legislation. I want to express my appreciation to Richard E. Rassell and Leonard M.
Niehoff, associated with Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile, and other organizers of
the conference for their invitation to address the group and for their hospitality.
I also wish to thank Sandra S. Baron, Managing General Attorney, National
Broadcasting Company and a panel member of the Annenberg Project; Professor Jerome
Barron of George Washington University, National Law Center; and Professor Marc A.
Franklin, Stanford Law School, who commented on a draft of this speech.
* General Counsel, U.S. News & World Report; Professor of Law, George Washing-
ton University, National Law Center (on leave); B.S. 1961, Loyola University, Chicago;
J.D. 1964, Northwestern University; Ph.D. 1968, Northwestern University.
1. The Ayatollah died on June 3, 1989. The reference in the text to "potent reme-
dies" is a reference to the order of Chemin that Moslems should assassinate Salman
Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses, and punish Viking Penguin, the publisher, and
others involved in distributing the book. Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
2. The Annenberg Washington Program was established by Northwestern University
in 1983. It seeks, through forums and research studies, to evaluate how communication
technologies and public policies on communications affect American life. The Libel Re-
form Project, conceived by the Program director Newton N. Minow, former FCC direc-
tor, reflects the belief "that the current libel system is not working well for anyone. It
neither adequately protects First Amendment values nor provides plaintiffs with an ef-
fective way to vindicate their damaged reputations." The Report of the Libel Reform
Project of the Annenberg Washington Program, Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law 7
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 23:1
ent attitudes toward the law of defamation. There were plain-
tiffs' attorneys and media lawyers, Tony Lewis of the New York
Times and the arch-conservative Bruce Fein, an academic, a
businessman, an insurance representative, and a judge. They
were charged with the task of seeking a consensus on how the
interests of freedom of the press could be reconciled with the
interest in safeguarding reputation. The proposed Libel Reform
Act is the result of their give-and-take sessions and the trade-
offs they made.'
In fact, the provisions of the Act are not really that new. It is
an amalgam of libel reform proposals that have been considered
over the last few years. For example, Representative Charles
Schumer of New York introduced proposed federal legislation
that would have allowed a media defendant a new cause of ac-
tion in the form of a declaratory judgment action.4 In addition,
other reform acts have been urged in California and Illinois.5 All
faced a hostile media response; none managed to secure any in-
terested, supportive constituency and died without any really se-
rious consideration. The Annenberg Libel Reform Act has been
introduced in the Connecticut Legislature, and I expect that it
will suffer the same fate as its predecessors. Before I discuss the
reasons for the failure of these reforms, I would like to talk
(1988) [hereinafter Annenberg Proposal] (on file at the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
3. The Proposed Libel Reform Act is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix [here-
inafter Act]. A section-by-section analysis of the Act is presented in Annenberg Proposal,
supra note 2, at 19-25.
4. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
5. See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 1979 (introduced by Senator Bill Lockyear); Ill. H.B. 1391 (in-
troduced by Rep. John Cullerton). Compare Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alterna-
tive to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1986) (advocating a declaratory judg-
ment alternative to a libel action for damages available at the plaintiff's option) with
Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847
(1986) (advocating a declaratory judgment alternative available to plaintiffs or defend-
ants in libel actions by public officials and public figures). See generally Barron, The
Search for Media Accountability, 19 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 789 (1985) (arguing for legisla-
tion giving plaintiff a "right of reply" as an alternative to a damages action); Cook, Rec-
onciling the First Amendment with the Individual's Reputation: The Declaratory Judg-
ment as an Option for Libel Suits, 93 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1989) (arguing for a declaratory
judgment alternative available to the libel plaintiff); Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault
Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988) (arguing
for a declaratory judgment alternative available to the libel plaintiff).
6. Conn. H.B. 5932, introduced by Rep. Richard Tulisano, in 1988, died in the Judici-
ary Committee of the Connecticut General Assembly. A similar bill, Iowa S.B. 40, was
introduced in the Iowa legislature but was not reported out of Committee. Ill. H.B. 1391,
introduced by Rep. John Cullerton, and California S.B. 1393, introduced by Sen. Barry
Keene, also using a declaratory judgment alternative to an action for damages, are under
consideration. News Notes, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) (No. 14) May 9, 1989.
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about the special provisions of the Annenberg Project's Libel
Reform Act.
The heart of the proposal is a two-stage, no-damages, no-fault
alternative to the present libel action for damages.7 Stage One
commences with a written demand by the plaintiff for a retrac-
tion or reply. The demand must be made within thirty days of
the defamatory publication, or the plaintiff's claim is barred. If
the defendant prints a legally satisfactory retraction or reply
within thirty days of the request, that ends the dispute.'
From the media's viewpoint, this Stage One retraction pro-
ceeding would have significant advantages over present law. Not
all states have retraction laws, and those that do vary considera-
bly. However, a retraction or reply does not stop a plaintiff from
litigating for actual damages.9 The printing of a retraction, as in
Michigan, only limits the damages that the plaintiff can re-
cover. 10 For example, the law might limit recoverable damages to
7. Act, § 1, abolishes the common-law action for false-light privacy. Although both
defamation and privacy are concerned with injury to human dignity rather than physical
injury, privacy seeks to redress the plaintiff's personal interest in emotional tranquility
rather than his relational interest in reputation, which is the focus of the defamation
tort. The Act would not preempt other related causes of action, such as intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court
extended the constitutional requirement of actual malice (See infra note 22) to defeat
the Rev. Jerry Falwell's mental distress claim against Hustler based on a parody in the
magazine.
8. Under Act, § 3, a "timely and conspicuous retraction" will bar the action. Even if
the plaintiff requests a right of reply, a retraction will suffice. In short, a media defend-
ant may, but need not, grant space for reply to avoid litigation.
Thirty days seems to me to be a very short "de facto statute of limitations." However,
most demands for corrections and retractions do arise shortly after publication, and
there is value in a prompt resolution of disputes. See Murasky, Avoidable Consequences
in Defamation: The Common-Law Duty to Request a Retraction, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
167, 168-69 (1988) (arguing that plaintiff's failure to seek a retraction should bar any
avoidable damages incurred after the time when the plaintiff could reasonably have re-
ported the error).
9. The "issue status" section of VI Libel Defense Resource Center, 50-State Survey
1988: Current Developments in Media Libel and Invasion of Privacy Law 934-37 (1988),
indicates that thirty-one states have retraction statutes and eleven other jurisdictions
recognize the limitation by other means, e.g., common law, jury instructions. Only one of
the retraction laws appeared to bar the plaintiff's action. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 589-619 app. (1980) (setting forth state retraction statutes).
10. MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 600.2911(2)(b) (West Supp. 1989) provides:
Exemplary and punitive damages shall not be recovered in actions for libel un-
less the plaintiff, before instituting his or her action, gives notice to the defend-
ant to publish a retraction and allows a reasonable time to do so, and proof of
the publication or correction shall be admissible in evidence under a denial on
the question of the good faith of the defendant, and in mitigation and reduction
of exemplary or punitive damages. For libel based on a radio or television broad-
cast, the retraction shall be made in the same manner and at the same time of
the day as the original libel; for libel based on a publication, the retraction shall
be published in the same size type, in the same editions and as far as practica-
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special damages or it might preclude punitive damages. Under
the proposed Libel Reform Act, a legally satisfactory retraction
or reply ends the plaintiff's claim.1"
The retraction provision of the Libel Reform Act offers the
promise of a speedy end to litigation and is likely to be wel-
comed by the media. But is it really desirable to bar all plaintiffs
from damage actions simply because the defendant prints a re-
traction? Suppose the plaintiff has suffered serious, provable ec-
onomic loss. Even granting the questionable assumption that a
retraction restores reputation, it cannot make up for economic
loss. Although I strongly believe in the value of retraction stat-
utes for avoiding needless litigation, I question the desirability
of foreclosing any damages action by a plaintiff. I would urge
instead that the printing of a legally satisfactory retraction, or a
reply where that remedy would be acceptable to the plaintiff,
should operate to limit the plaintiff to special damages (i.e., out-
of-pocket loss) or, alternatively, actual damages, defined solely
in terms of reputational harm. 2 Mental distress is simply too
ble, in substantially the same position as the original libel; and for other libel,
the retraction shall be published or communicated in substantially the same
manner as the original libel.
11. Act, § 3(f), provides that "[a] conspicuous retraction is a retraction published in
substantially the same place and manner, as the defamatory statements being retracted.
The placement and timing of the retraction must be reasonably calculated to reach the
same audience as the prior defamatory statements being retracted." In its section-by-
section analysis, the Annenberg Proposal states that "[t]o be sufficient, a retraction must
withdraw and repudiate the prior defamatory statements and publish the corrected
facts." Annenberg Proposal, supra note 2, at 21. Recognizing the special problem posed
by implied defamation rather than defamation by an actual statement made in the pub-
lication, the Annenberg Proposal provides that a retraction is sufficient if the defendant
indicates he "did not intend either to state or to imply the meaning ascribed by the
plaintiff." Id. See Act, §§ 3(9)-3(h),for other provisions seeking to clarify the nature of a
legally satisfactory retraction or reply. Section 10(a) of the Act provides for an award of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the sufficiency of a retraction or reply is
litigated.
12. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), compensatory or actual dam-
age was defined to include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community,
personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350. Although damages
for mental suffering might well be included as parasitic damages, I would argue that they
should not be included as compensatory damages. The defamation tort is concerned with
harm to reputation and to the plaintiff's relations with others-not primarily with emo-
tional distress. The interest in emotional tranquility is protected by torts such as privacy
and intentional infliction of mental distress. Harm to reputation should be a prerequisite
to maintaining a defamation action. See Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and
Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984) (criticism of allowing recovery without proof of
actual harm to reputation).
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open-ended; it is too often simply punitive damages by another
name.
13
Under the proposed Libel Reform Act, if no satisfactory re-
traction or reply is published, we move to Stage Two. This is
where the real controversy is centered. At Stage Two, either
party may finally convert the claim into a no-fault, declaratory
judgment action on the issue of truth or falsity. If either party
elects the declaratory judgment route, that is conclusive-there
can be no damages action.14 The prevailing party on the issue of
truth or falsity gets attorney's fees from the loser.
1 5
In the Stage Two declaratory judgment proceeding, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving falsity by clear and convincing
evidence. Although it is not completely clear under the Act, I
believe that a more exact statement is that the plaintiff must
prove the absence of substantial truth. 6 Clearly, under Phila-
delphia Newspapers v. Hepps, a libel plaintiff seeking damages
must prove the falsity of the publication, at least in public inter-
est speech cases.1 7 But modern libel law is unclear as to whether
substantial truth is a privilege that the defendant must allege
and prove or whether it is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case,
i.e., the plaintiff must prove the absence of substantial truth to
prove falsity.18
Let me provide an example. Noah Robinson, Jesse Jackson's
half-brother, sued U.S. News and World Report for libel. I
hasten to add that the publication occurred before I became
General Counsel. Our magazine had printed a short item noting
13. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text on punitive damages in defamation
actions.
14. Act, § 4(e).
15. Act, § 10(b).
16. Act, § 6(a) and (b), provides that the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity
and that this burden cannot be met if the defamatory statements are substantially true.
Although I interpret this to mean that the plaintiff has the burden in the absence of on
substantial truth, the section could be read merely to recognize the defense of substan-
tial truth.
17. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Arguably the burden of proof on the falsity issue was placed
on public officials as early as New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (a "public official [is] allowed the civil
[defamation] remedy only if he establishes that the utterance [is] false."). My caveat in
the text limiting the principle to public interest cases is necessitated by Dun & Brad-
street v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), where the Court allowed the recovery
of presumed and punitive damages by a private figure plaintiff when the defamatory
publication did not involve a matter of public concern. Dun & Bradstreet may presage a
more general limitation of constitutional protections in private speech cases.
18. At common law, substantial truth was an affirmative defense. While Hepps
makes falsity part of plaintiff's prima facie case, courts frequently continue to refer to
the "defense" of truth.
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Robinson's arrest for conspiracy in the stabbing of a federal
grand jury witness in South Carolina, the fact that Robinson was
a target in a federal drug trafficking investigation, and that his
apartment and office in Chicago had been searched by federal
agents pursuant to a warrant. 9 Everything was true, except that
Robinson had been arrested and charged by local police, rather
than by FBI agents as we had published.2 0 Robinson sued U.S.
News for $2 million-one million in compensatory damages and
one million in punitives. Our publication was inaccurate, some
would say "false." But we would argue that the article was "sub-
stantially true." Its "gist" and "sting" concerning the arrest were
accurate; the error in detail did not add significantly to the
reputational harm that would result from the true facts. Did
Robinson have the burden of proving that the publication was
not "substantially true," or did U.S. News have the burden of
showing that, although the publication was inaccurate as to a
detail of the arrest, it was substantially true? The distinction
had procedural significance. Could we move to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure of the plaintiff to state a claim under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or did we have to answer, plead substantial truth
as a defense, and then move for judgment on the pleadings or, in
the alternative, summary judgment? We decided not to take
chances and answered, arguing that the plaintiff could not prove
the absence of substantial truth. Our motion is still pending in
the federal court.2 1
Although I believe it is likely that either the plaintiff or the
defendant will choose the declaratory judgment option, if
neither party elects this route, then the matter is handled as an
ordinary damages action under familiar libel law rules, including
the requirement that the plaintiff prove fault.2
19. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 20, 1988, p. 14.
20. In fact, Robinson was charged and indicted on four different counts. He was sub-
sequently charged inter alia with murder. Although the jury was unable to reach a ver-
dict on most of the charges, Robinson was convicted as an accessory after the fact of
assault and battery and sentenced to ten years. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
21. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on grounds that the arti-
cle was substantially true. Robinson v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 16 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) (No. 19) 1695 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
22. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), held that actual malice, i.e.,
subjective knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, is required for
defamation actions brought by public officials. Justice Warren extended the actual mal-
ice standard to public figures in his concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), the Court held
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defam-
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There is, however, one vital, valuable change-neither puni-
tive nor presumed damages are recoverable.2" This is sweet mu-
sic to the media. Punitive damages constitute one of the great
uncertainties in modern libel law-they are an essentially un-
controlled element bearing no relationship to compensatory
damages, threatening defendants generally and the media in
particular.24 "Less reputable" publishers, such as Hustler, Pent-
house, or The National Enquirer, are especially susceptible to
the threat of huge punitive damage awards bearing no relation
to a plaintiff's actual losses.2
But even "reputable" media face the threat of huge punitive
damages awards. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson,26 the defendants were sued for making false state-
atory falsehood injurious to a private individual." But see supra note 17 on the possible
implications of Dun & Bradstreet.
Most states have opted for a negligence standard in private figure cases; however, a
few have retained a more demanding fault standard. Although it appeared that Michigan
would require actual malice in cases involving speech in the "public interest," in Rouch
v. Enquirer News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich. 157, 398 N.W.2d 245 (1986), the court re-
jected the public interest standard and adopted negligence. See Niehoff, Constitutional
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 565 (1988). Efforts to legislate a "public interest and concern"
privilege failed. But the legislature in a last-minute revision, required that, in a suit
brought by a private figure plaintiff based on negligence, "[riecovery... shall be limited
to economic damages including attorney fees." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(7)
(West Supp. 1989). The effect of this damages limitation was a subject of debate at the
Wayne State Media Law Conference.
23. Act, § 9(b) & (d). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court
rejected awards of presumed and punitive damages, absent proof of actual malice, stat-
ing: "[Plunitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the State interest that justifies a negli-
gence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury.
Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries .... " Id. at 350. But cf. Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing states to award pre-
sumed and punitive damages in defamation actions brought by private figure plaintiffs
where the publication does not involve matters of public concern). See generally, Libel
Defense Resource Center, "Punitive Damages in Libel Actions," LDRC Bulletin No. 24
(Dec. 1988), at 1-43.
24. The study by the Libel Defense Resource Center [hereinafter LDRC] indicates
that punitive damages are awarded in 60% of all libel cases in which plaintiffs win dam-
ages against the media. The average punitive damage award between 1980 and 1986 was
approximately $2,000,000. Libel Defense Resource Center, "Punitive Damages in Libel
Actions," LDRC Bulletin No. 24 (Dec. 1988), at 8. See LDRC Bulletin No. 21 (Oct.
1987), at 19.
25. In Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, Justice Powell stated that punitive damages allow juries
"uncontrolled discretion ...to punish unpopular opinions . . . ." See generally LDRC
Bulletin No. 18 (Dec. 1986), at 61-62 (citing Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) ($37,000,000 in punitive damages); Lerman v.
Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d. 123 (2d Cir. 1984) ($33,000,000 in punitive damages), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l., 695 F.2d. 438 (10th Cir. 1982)
($25,000,000 in punitive damages).
26. 644 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Il. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 U.S. 1302 (1988). A jury recently awarded Richard DeSalle, a former Pennsyl-
vania Circuit Court judge, nearly $2,800,000-$2].0,000 in compensatory damages and
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ments claiming the tobacco companies' ads appealed to youth,
using pot, sex, and alcohol as come-on themes. For the first time,
the $1,000,000 damages figure was surpassed when the tobacco
company recovered $3,000,000, $2,000,000 of which was in the
form of punitive damages. I believe that the defendants' conduct
was reprehensible. Nevertheless, awarding $1,000,000 (originally
$3,000,000) to the tobacco company for injury to its reputation
and subjecting a broadcaster to $2,000,000 in punitive damages
for publishing material commenting on tobacco advertising to
youth seems to me to be an excessively dangerous threat to press
freedom.
A few jurisdictions have legislatively limited punitive damage
awards for certain torts.27 Disproportionate punitive damages
have been constitutionally challenged before the Supreme Court
in a non-media case, on grounds that the punitive damages, 100
times higher than the compensatories, constituted excessive
fines in violation of the eighth amendment and a denial of due
process.2" I personally believe that the elimination of this puni-
tive device, either through judicial action or reform legislation,
would provide a worthwhile change in libel law.
In the litigation stages under the proposed Libel Reform Act,
media defendants can claim various privileges.29 One of the most
$2,000,000 punitive damages-against the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. The case was af-
firmed on appeal and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. DeSalle had sued for libel
based on newspaper charges that, as an attorney, he had been part of a conspiracy to
falsify a will. See Radolf, The Chilling Effect, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 22, 1989, at 11-
12.
27. It has been claimed that some 35 states have enacted legislation limiting punitive
damages or their availability which could apply to libel. Kaufman, Johnston, & Sackler,
Tort Reform and Libel, 10 COMM. & LAW 15, 31 (1988). Though many of these reforms
are limited to defining procedures or evidentiary standards for awards of punitive dam-
ages, other laws "cap" punitive damage awards or require that such awards bear some
defined proportional relationship to the compensatory damage award. The recent schol-
arly commentary on punitive damages in libel cases has been extensive. See, e.g., Jeffries,
A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986);
Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 793 (1984); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1699 (1987); Note, Punitive Damages in Libel Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 847 (1985).
28. In Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989), the
Court held 7-2 that the excessive fines clause does not apply to punitive damage awards
in civil cases between private parties. The due process issue was held not to have been
properly raised in the lower court or on appeal.
29. Act, § 8, provides for absolute privilege, in both declaratory judgment and dam-
age actions, for participants in judicial proceedings and legislative proceedings, and par-
ticipants in quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative executive or administrative proceedings.
Section 8 also recognizes a variety of common law conditional privileges in damage ac-
tions. Because a conditional privilege would put the defendant's fault in issue, these
[VOL. 23:1
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important is a neutral reportage privilege, which also includes
the common law privilege to report matters of the public rec-
ord.30 But this is not simply the neutral reportage privilege rec-
ognized by a number of jurisdictions.31 Under the traditional
neutral reportage doctrine, the truth or falsity of the statement
reported is irrelevant; all that is required for invoking the privi-
lege is that a responsible person made the statement, that the
statement is accurately reported, and that it is newsworthy. But
the proposed Libel Reform Act goes even further. The Act pro-
vides for a sweeping, absolute privilege for accurate reporting of
the statements of any person or organization, so long as the
matter involves the public interest and the source is identified."
When I engage in prepublication review, one of the subjects of
major concern for me is the credibility of the source. I will re-
privileges would not be available in declaratory judgment actions under the Act. See
Annenberg Proposal, supra note 23. On absolute and conditional privileges in defama-
tion action, see generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 815-38 (5th ed.
1984); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS ch. 6 (P.L.I. 1980); B. SANFORD,
LIBEL AND PRIVACY ch. 10 (1985) (looseleaf service); R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION ch. 8
(1989) (looseleaf service); Winfield & Cavanaugh, Privileges Redux: Rediscovering the
Common Law, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1988 31-49 (P.L.I. 1988).
30. Act, § 5. See also Annenberg Proposal, supra note 2, at 23, (noting that the fair
report privilege is "automatically encompassed by the absolute neutral reportage privi-
lege established in Section 5."). The fair report privilege is recognized by RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, sec. 611 (1977):
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an offi-
cial action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a
matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a
fair abridgment of the occurrence reported.
See generally D. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE (1988).
31. The neutral reportage privilege permits republication of a defamatory statement
even where the publisher doubts the truth of the statement. It was introduced in Ed-
wards v. National Audubon Soc., 423 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 113
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
For a survey of the judicial reaction to the doctrine, now recognized in about a half-
dozen jurisdictions, see Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a Defense Against Republishing
Libel, 11 COMM. & LAW 3 (1989). See generally J. BARRON & C.T. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF
FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 6.26 (1979).
32. The nature of the "official proceedings" covered by statutory privilege became a
major source of dispute in Michigan as a result of the decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court in Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich. 157, 398 N.W.2d 245
(1986). Rouch held that arrest information provided by police to a newspaper was not
covered by the statutory fair report privilege. The court reasoned that the statute
"evoked notions of adjudicatory action, rather than of government action generally." 427
Mich. at 172, 398 N.W.2d at 252. The statute was revised to provide:
Damages shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast
of a fair and true report of matters of public record, a public and official pro-
ceeding, or if a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report
or record generally available to the public, or act or action of a public body, or
for a reading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the report.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(3) (West Supp. 1989).
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view with the reporter who the source is, why he is in a position
to know, if there is any reason to expect a bias, the possibility of
corroboration through other sources, and whether we have
checked with the target of the statement for his side of the
story. None of these questions would really be necessary to ask
under the proposed neutral reportage privilege.
But I am increasingly coming to the conclusion that these
questions should not control what gets published in the me-
dia-that the only proper question should be: was the state-
ment, in fact, made by the source cited? Is it really the function
of a reporter and lawyer to judge the credibility of a source and
then to decide whether or not to publish? It is not as if the judg-
ment concerning credibility were a clear, objective determina-
tion. Just ask John Tower and the Senate. Judging credibility is
a highly subjective process, often involving great uncertainty.
Yet, because of the uncertainty over credibility, the media may
suppress newsworthy reports. Perhaps, if the matter is news-
worthy, it should be accurately communicated to the public with
disclosure of the source. The public would then be allowed to
hear the statement and make its own assessment of the merits of
the statement. After all, the media is truthfully reporting what
was said-its value is a question for the public.
This, then, is the essence of the proposed Libel Reform Act.
The ability to end libel actions with a retraction, abolition of
presumed and punitive damages, a sweeping, absolute neutral
reportage privilege-all are changes that would be individually
welcomed by the media. And yet, it is likely that the media
would strongly oppose the proposed Act or any similar no-fault,
declaratory judgment reform. Why? The answer lies in the costs
and risks of any no-fault, declaratory judgment proposal.
A clear cost of any no-fault, declaratory judgment reform is
loss of the New York Times privilege. 3 Currently, the require-
33. See supra note 22. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), held
that a public official cannot recover in defamation absent clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. Public officials include those government employees with policy-making
authority and access to the media. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). One study estimated that 87% percent of all
media libel cases are resolved on the basis of New York Times privilege. R. BEZANSON, G.
CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 185 (1987).
My speech was not intended to address the question of whether a statute eliminating
the constitutional privilege would be constitutional. Counsel for the New York Times,
Floyd Abrams, for example, observed: "It may well be that the First Amendment does
not permit defendants to be stripped of all the protection afforded by New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan simply because a declaratory judgment is sought." A.B.A. J. 34 (Jan.
1989). As will be noted below, a declaratory judgment still provides a potential "chilling
effect" on press freedom-the threat of media self-censorship-emphasized by Justice
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ment that a libel plaintiff prove fault is the greatest protection
for the media. The public figure plaintiff must prove knowledge
of falsity or subjective awareness of a high probability of fal-
sity. 4 The private figure plaintiff must prove at least negli-
gence.3 5 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell recently reaffirmed the vi-
tality of this New York Times first amendment protection.3 6
Because of the fault requirement, most public figure libel ac-
tions can be disposed of prior to trial, at the motions stage.
Under the standards set forth in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,3 7
Brennan in New York Times. It is arguable that the threat of attorney's fees, an in-
creased number of libel claims and costly litigation over the question of truth or falsity,
produce an excessive chill on press freedom. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text. Finally, it is arguable that the constitutional privilege fashioned in New York
Times is as much a matter of principle-of protecting the special role of the media in
our democratic system-as a matter of the impact of libel damages on the media. See
Kirtley, Proposal to Reform Libel Law Has Troubling Aspects, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Nov. 5, 1988, at 52.
34. The constitutional privilege was extended to public figure plaintiffs through Chief
Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), the Court defined public figures
to include pervasive, all-purpose public figures and limited purpose public figures:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
In subsequent cases, involving the limited purpose public figure, the Court has nar-
rowly defined the category, focusing on the two requirements of voluntary participation
and public controversy. Plaintiff's access to the press is an important consideration. See
Time, Inc. v. Firestone 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wealthy socialite in bizarre divorce proceed-
ing held to be a private figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (research
scientist receiving federal grants held to be a private figure); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (person guilty of contempt for failure to appear before a grand
jury investigating Soviet espionage held to be a private figure).
35. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In addition to precluding strict
liability, Gertz bars presumed and punitive damages, at least absent proof of actual mal-
ice. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court re-
stricted the Gertz damage limitations to speech involving matters of public concern. See
supra note 17.
36. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See supra note 7.
37. 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986). In Anderson, the Court stated:
[W]here the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue in a
New York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be
whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either
that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or
that the plaintiff has not.
Id. The same demanding clear and convincing evidence burden of actual malice that the
libel plaintiff must satisfy at trial applies in determining whether the case should go to
trial. Even with the broad discovery into defendant's state of mind during the editorial
process permitted by Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), plaintiffs have difficulty
meeting this standard.
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construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it is clear that the public figure plaintiff will not be
able to prove constitutional malice by clear and convincing evi-
dence. In that case, summary judgment will be granted. 8
If a libel plaintiff does get to the jury, the media will probably
lose-the media lose about two-thirds of all jury verdicts,39
which often provide for huge damage awards.40 One could get
the impression that juries do not like the media. Nevertheless,
about seventy-five percent of these adverse jury verdicts are re-
versed or modified on appeal."' Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union,42 in cases where a jury has found that the defendant ac-
ted with constitutional malice, the appellate courts engage in an
independent, de novo review of the evidence.43 The proper scope
of this appellate review has proven controversial; the subject was
again before the Supreme Court recently in Harte-Hanks Com-
munications v. Connaughton." But, at least presently, the ap-
pellate courts actively reverse adverse jury verdicts.
38. Approximately 75% of defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted.
LDRC Bulletin No. 12 (Dec. 1984), at 1-32; Kaufman Trends in Damage Awards, Insur-
ance Premiums, and the Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL 1, 7 (E.
Dennis and E. Noam eds. 1989).
39. Henry Kaufman, general counsel at LDRC, sets the loss figure at sixty to seventy
percent. See Stille, Libel Law Takes on a New Look, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 32, col.
3. The LDRC estimates 75% losses in jury trial cases. LDRC Bulletin No. 21 (Oct. 1987),
at 11.
40. The LDRC reports 32 of 126 libel damage awards studied at or in excess of
$1,000,000 between 1980-1986. LDRC Bulletin No. 21 (Oct. 1987), at 19. In a 1982 study
of 47 damage awards, the average of 30 of the awards exceeded $2,000,000. LDRC Bulle-
tin No. 11 (Nov. 1984), at 14-15.
41. See Kaufman, supra note 38, at 7 n.33 (citing LDRC Damages Study No. 1 at 7;
LDRC Damages Study No. 2, at 19-21).
42. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
43. In Bose the Court stated:
We hold that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in
reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York
Times v. Sullivan. Appellate judges in such a case must exercise independent
judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with con-
vincing clarity.
Id. at 514 (footnote omitted).
44. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989). A candidate for municipal judge in Ohio sued the Journal
News for reporting that a grand jury witness had alleged that he offered bribes for their
help in securing information concerning the incumbent judge who had been endorsed by
the paper. Id. at 2682. The jury, finding actual malice, awarded the candidate $5,000 in
compensatory damages and $195,000 in punitive damages. Id. The Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court affirmed.
Although Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court is highly fact-specific, the case does
reaffirm Bose by requiring the appellate court to reexamine the factual record. Id, at
2694-95. Even though jury credibility determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous
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The bottom line is that today libel plaintiffs almost always
lose. Only about ten percent of libel plaintiff actions ultimately
survive the litigation process.45 Awards for survivors have been,
on the average, between $100,000 and $150,000.46 Given this
kind of potential payoff, or lack thereof, it is not surprising that
libel actions are declining-down over twenty percent during the
past couple of years.47 Unless the action is simply punitive, to
harm the media, it is increasingly not economically viable for
plaintiffs to pursue litigation.
Of course, victory may be costly for the media. About eighty
percent of libel insurance costs are incurred in defending libel
actions, rather than in compensating injured plaintiffs.48 In the
Westmoreland case, for example, CBS expended over $6,000,000
in its successful defense." But honestly, these mega-costs for li-
bel defense are rare. Most libel defense costs are far less expen-
sive. The average defense cost is about $100,000.10 Nevertheless,
this is a significant amount, particularly for small uninsured
publishers,5 and the possibility of a costly defense is ever
present.
standard on appeal, the appellate court must review the entire record to determine if it
supports the jury findings of actual malice. Id. at 2696.
45. Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 795, 811. Note that the 10% figure does not reflect settlements. Time, Inc., for
example, recently settled a libel claim for a reported $500,000. Stille, supra note 39, at 1.
I am not aware of any statistics regarding libel settlements.
46. Kaufman, supra note 38, at 7 (citing LDRC Damages Study No. 2, at 23) set the
average award at under $100,000. More recently, the estimate has been $150,000. See
Kaufman, Johnston, & Sackler, Tort Reform and Libel, 10 COMM. & LAW 15, 20 (1988);
Stille, supra note 39, at 32, col.4.
47. Johnson & Kaufman, Annenberg, Sullivan at Twenty-Five, and the Question of
Libel Reform, 7 COMM. LAWYER 3, 6 (1989). Stille, supra note 39, at 32, col.1, reports a
decline of 25% to 40% from 1985 estimates. Even Rodney Smolla, director of the An-
nenberg Project, while arguing that the case for libel reform is compelling, acknowledges
that "[flrom the defense view, certainly, a case may be made for the status quo. The
siege on the citadel has abated . . . . The crisis . . . has run its course. Most media
defendants have recently experienced an easing in the number of libel suits they are
facing. Insurance markets have adjusted." Smolla, A Defense of the Annenberg Libel
Reform Proposal, 7 COMM. LAWYER 3 (1989).
48. Lankenau, Living With the Risk of Libel, FOLIO MAG., Nov. 1985, at 171.
49. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The defense cost
estimate is from Lankenau, supra note 48, at 171. See also J.C. Goodale, Survey of Re-
cent Media Verdicts, Their Disposition on Appeal, and Media Costs in MEDIA INSUR-
ANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 69 (J. Lankenau ed. 1985).
50. Kaufman, Johnston & Sackler, supra note 46, at 27 n.41. Other estimates run as
high as over $200,000. See Cook, supra note 5, at 278.
51. Many small publishers are unable to afford libel insurance. See Massing, Libel
Insurance: Scrambling for Coverage, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb. 1986, at 35. The Al-
ton Telegraph was forced into bankruptcy by libel loss. See Green v. Alton Tel. Printing
Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 755, 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982). For an account of the litigation, see T.
LIUTrLEWOOD, COALS OF FIRE: THE ALTON TELEGRAPH LIBEL CASE (1988). The need for
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The real question for the media is: Is the potential savings in
litigation costs from a declaratory judgment alternative worth
the loss of the constitutional privilege, with its concomitant high
probability of a media win? For most media defendants, I doubt
it. The proponents of these reform proposals picture the declara-
tory judgment action as a simple, relatively low-cost determina-
tion of truth or falsity. But is that accurate? It seems to me that,
for many cases, the reform advocates grossly underestimate the
difficulty of determining truth or falsity. As I indicated earlier,
inaccuracies in a publication do not necessarily render a publica-
tion false-the "gist" or "sting" of a story may still be substan-
tially true.52 Truth and falsity are not simple axioms to be
demonstrated, but are often highly controversial findings over
which lawyers will spill blood.
Further, the plaintiff must prove a false statement of fact.
Opinion is fully protected both under the proposed Libel Re-
form Act and as a matter of constitutional law.53 Those of you
who regularly read libel cases know the controversy and uncer-
tainty of the fact/opinion distinction. It has become one of the
special consideration of the problems posed for small publishers by libel litigation has
been noted. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a
Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1983); Nagel, How to Stop Libel Suits and Still
Protect Individual Reputations, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1985, at 12.
52. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note
47, at 4, observe that "[t]he declaratory judgment proposal, among other conceptual defi-
ciencies fails to recognize that the most seriously litigated libel disputes do not focus on
readily ascertainable matters of truth or falsity, but rather on the quite debatable impli-
cations of competing interpretation of controverted facts .... ." They add that
"[Ilitigating truth/falsity . . . is usually if not always more costly than litigating fault
. ... Id. at 6. Cameron DeVore, a noted media defense attorney, similarly notes: "Evi-
dence of 'truth' is almost always the most costly component of libel defense." The An-
nenberg Libel Proposal, unpublished paper, Dec. 12, 1988, at 4 (on file at the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Criticizing the Annenberg proposal, he warns that
"[w]hen a subject complains about a big story that the media believes to be true but
(like most big stories) might have difficulty proving to be true in a court of law, the
media would be faced with a Hobson's choice. It would either have to throw in the towel
and retract, or likely be remitted to a trial where 'truth' would be determined by a judge,
winner take all." Id. See also Radoff, Defining the Sullivan Decision, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, April 15, 1989, at 9-10, (citing similar reactions of a number of media attorneys to
the Annenberg proposal).
But see R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG, & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY 106-07 (1987), who argue that it is the element of fault that provides the most
significant element of litigation costs. But, at the present time, it is plaintiff's inability to
prove fault that permits early dismissal of most libel litigation. If fault is removed as the
dispositive issue, it is probable that truth or falsity would be litigated in far more cases
than it is presently.
53. See Act, § 2. In Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-340, the Court stated: "Under the First
Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas."
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most controversial issues in libel litigation." And the fact/opin-
ion distinction will continue to be a virulent source of contro-
versy in a declaratory judgment action.
I believe that removal of the fault issue, in most cases, will
simply redefine the litigation-truth or falsity will become the
focus of the battle. I have great faith in lawyers to fill any vac-
uum created by the loss of a legal issue. If fault is no longer an
issue, lawyers will see to it that truth or falsity rises in its place.
Moreover, if the press loses on the truth or falsity issue, the me-
dia will pay the plaintiff's attorney fees and other costs.5" The
reality is that the media is likely to lose much more often on
truth and falsity, deprived of the fault buffer provided by the
New York Times privilege.
In addition to the clear costs resulting from all of these no-
fault, declaratory judgment reform proposals, the reforms also
pose additional risks for the media. One is sort of a generic risk
posed by any legislative reform. The media becomes very up-
tight whenever its interests become the focus of legislative, and
especially state legislative, action. Even if the proposed Libel
Reform Act were acceptable to the media as written-which it is
not-media advocates are not certain that the proposal would
stay "as written" when it reaches the legislative arena. Upsetting
the delicate tradeoffs underlying a reform act might well create a
law with significant chilling effects on press freedom. Put sim-
54. For example, consider whether epithets such as "scam," "scab," "sleazebag," "in-
sane," "Mafia kingpin," constitute statements of fact or opinion. Perhaps the most
widely used test for distinguishing fact from opinion looks to the "totality of the circum-
stances" to determine whether "the average reader" would view the statement as fact or
opinion. In deciding such an issue, a court should consider the common usage or meaning
of the specific language, its verifiability, the full context of the statement and the setting
in which it appears. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). See Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986), adopting Oilman's four part test and adding,
from Judge Bork's concurrence in Oilman, consideration of the function of the state-
ment, i.e., does it contribute to maintaining a vigorous political arena.
55. Act, § 10. The award of attorney's fees against the defendant, absent any proof of
fault, again raises the question of the constitutionality of the proposed Libel Reform Act.
See supra note 33. The threat of heavy litigation costs when the issue of truth or falsity
is especially unclear could produce the "chilling effect," stressed in New York Times v.
Sullivan. Professor Smolla, director of the Annenberg project, argues: "If the net "chil-
ling effect" of all of the provisions of the comprehensive new reform structure would be
less than that of the old system (including New York Times and Gertz) then the fee-
shifting device should be constitutional." Smolla, supra note 47, at 11. He draws support
for the proposal's constitutionality from the judicial treatment of the Civil Rights Attor-
neys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, allowing attorneys' fees even against a defendant who
enjoys immunity from damages. However, it is questionable that the common law immu-
nity enjoyed by officials is comparable to the first amendment privilege fashioned in New
York Times and its progeny.
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ply, the media does not trust legislators. They believe, rightly or
wrongly, that a number of legislators are waiting out there with
their axes honed ready to do violence to the press. Courts seem a
far friendlier preserve in which to do battle for first amendment
freedoms.56
Another risk for the media is increased libel complaints by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs under the reform acts would have an oppor-
tunity to win by establishing falsity and, if they win, of shifting
their costs to the defendant. An Iowa Libel Research Project
claims that most libel plaintiffs do not really want money, but
instead seek vindication of their reputation, or vengeance.57 If
that is true, a system that affords plaintiffs a meaningful chance
to secure vindication by a retraction, or a declaration of falsity,
could stimulate increased libel complaints. I doubt many editors,
especially those at the smaller newspapers, will look kindly on
such a risk.
Furthermore, how will the publishers, editors, and journalists
respond to the proposed Libel Reform Act if it were enacted? I
would like to believe that media such as the New York Times,
CBS and NBC, U.S. News, or that other magazine-I forget the
name, but it has something to do with clocks-would be just as
careful in prepublication review. But "the media" is not homo-
geneous-there are a variety of different entities that make up
"the media." How will some of the "less reputable" publishers
respond? Under the proposed Libel Reform Act, such publishers
could eliminate any chance of damages through a retraction or a
simple default at the beginning of the declaratory judgment
stage-a cheap, effective way of eliminating complaints. Indeed,
even libel insurance would probably be unnecessary with such a
low-cost option available.
I have been looking at these reform proposals from the me-
dia's perspective. But lawyers who represent libel plaintiffs have
not been especially enthusiastic for these proposals. The Iowa
Project's claims notwithstanding, many libel plaintiffs do want
56. See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 47, at 6. An extreme statement of this feel-
ing is the reaction of Don Reuben, a leading media lawyer, to the Annenberg project: "I
don't want anything that a legislature gives me . . . [t]hey could screw up a three-car
funeral. I'd rather leave it up to the courts. The courts gave you New York Times (pro-
tections)." De Vincenzo, Libel Law Under Scrutiny, Newport News, Va. Press, February
13, 1989, at B3.
57. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 52, at 93. See Bezanson, The Libel
Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 789




money. 8 Indeed, for a number of libel plaintiffs who suffer ac-
tual damage to reputation, particularly provable economic loss,
from a libelous publication, money provides vital compensa-
tion.59 And yet, under the Annenberg proposal, no matter how
much injury to reputation and economic damage the plaintiff
suffers, no matter how wrongful the conduct of the defendant,
the plaintiff can be barred from a damages action. Intentional
libel resulting in provable economic harm could be redressed
only by a declaration of falsity.
Consider the case of a young attorney, Kid Lawyer, recently
out of law school, who leaves the big city and goes to a small
community. She soon begins a successful practice. But the other
lawyer in town, who has enjoyed a monopoly on the legal busi-
ness for forty years, is not happy. He has a friend who owns the
local newspaper. He gets him to run an article, loaded with de-
famatory, harmful statements about Kid Lawyer. Kid Lawyer's
shingle is soon hanging low. What can she do? Under the Act,
very little. She is limited to seeking a retraction or reply or a
declaration of falsity. This is little solace for her economic loss.
Of course, if you do not believe in any law of libel, this scena-
rio might not be troubling. For you, absolute privilege may be
the price we pay for a free press. But if you believe, as I do, that
reputation is a valuable personal interest deserving of legal pro-
tection, and/or that the press can abuse its constitutional posi-
tion, then you may well conclude that there is a need for some
law of libel. Admittedly, such libel law must provide adequate
protection to the press against excessive chill. New York Times
and its progeny have provided such a balance. It is not a perfect
58. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 52, at 93. At a conference held on the
Annenberg proposal on February 13, 1989 in Washington, D.C., media lawyers and other
media representatives present, including this author, seriously questioned the Iowa
Study's finding on plaintiffs' motivations. Consider the following observation of Gilbert
Cranberg, a founder of the Iowa project:
Establishing motive in libel is especially complex given the frequently intangible
character of the harm; the role played by anger and the desire to punish; the
way objectives shift over time; the satisfaction people get merely by suing; and
the influence of lawyers, whose interests may not be congruent with those of
their clients.
In Libel, Money Isn't Everything, Wall St. J., July 13, 1989, p. A14.
59. Both Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 809, 836-842 (1986) and Cook, Reconciling the First Amendment With the Individ-
ual's Reputation: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option for Libel Suits, 93 DICK. L.
REV. 265, 295-303 (1989), while advocating a declaratory judgment alternative to libel
damages, reject giving the defendant an option to convert the damages claim. On the
other hand, the Schumer bill, supra note 4, the Barrett article, supra note 5, and the
Annenberg Proposal, supra note 2 (citing the need for effective press freedom), would
afford defendants a conversion option.
FALL 1989]
Journal of Law Reform
balance, and many of the separate proposals of the Annenberg
Project are most attractive. For example, elimination of punitive
damages, retraction laws limiting plaintiffs to special or reputa-
tion-based actual damages, and some form of neutral reportage
privilege would be desirable changes in libel law. But the Libel
Reform Act's declaratory judgment proposal is unacceptable.
I would suggest that a better approach, at least as an initial
step, is to make the declaratory judgment truly optional. Only if
both parties agree to forgo the fault-based damages action, in
favor of a no-fault, declaratory judgment action to determine
truth or falsity, would that track be used. In other words, either
party could veto the use of the declaratory judgment option."a
If it is true, as reform proponents claim, that many plaintiffs
out there are only seeking vindication of their reputation, one
could expect that they would opt for the declaratory judgment
route. If, as reform proponents also claim, the declaratory judg-
ment route would benefit many media defendants, especially
smaller media threatened by heavy litigation costs and damages,
one could expect them to follow their self-interest and elect the
declaratory judgment option. These interests may or may not
coalesce. However, the no-fault, no damages, declaratory judg-
ment option would never be imposed on the parties. Such an
approach would have the advantage of providing a trial of re-
form, without excessively distorting the present structure of libel
law."1 If the option is mutually elected and works in some cases,
it can be expected that it would be more frequently used.
I admit that this proposal is not as exciting as a total restruc-
turing of the law. It may, in fact, produce only minimal change.
But I believe it is preferable to proposals that simply force a
predetermined structure on the variety of plaintiffs and defend-
ants involved in libel litigation. It is preferable to proposals that
abandon the New York Times balance in favor of a questionable
legislative experiment that restructures libel law.
60. My proposal is analogous to the National Libel Dispute Resolution Program at
the University of Iowa. While the Iowa program involves a no fault, no damages private
proceeding, agreed to by both parties, I would employ the adjudicative structure already
in place. It should be noted that the Iowa project had not gotten any cases during its
first year of operation. Stein, Libel Resolution Program Off to a Slow Start, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Dec. 10, 1988, at 18.
61. The question of whether libel reform should occur through federal or state law is
troubling. The Annenberg Proposal leaves the issue undecided by providing alternative
formulations. Act § 14. A federal law would avoid the forum shopping dangers of a state-
by-state approach. But a federal law would also preempt the libel law of the states, thus
losing the values found through state experimentation. Compare Franklin, supra note 5,
at 818-19 (opting for state reform) with Cook, supra note 5, at 292 (arguing that "[tihe




THE LIBEL REFORM ACT
PREAMBLE
The purpose of this Act is to provide an efficient and speedy
remedy for defamation, emphasizing the compelling public inter-
est in the dissemination of truth in the marketplace. The provi-
sions of this Act are intended to encourage the prompt resolu-
tion of defamation disputes through remedies other than money
damages and should be liberally construed to accomplish that
purpose.
SECTION 1: SCOPE OF COVERAGE
(a) One Cause of Action
One cause of action, for defamation, shall exist for all claims
based on publication of false defamatory statements. The cause
of action for false-light invasion of privacy is abolished.
(b) Publication Defined
Publication is the communication of defamatory matter, inten-
tionally or by negligent act, to one other than the person
defamed.
(c) No Distinction Between Media and Nonmedia
The provisions of this Act shall apply without regard to the me-
dia or nonmedia status of the publisher.
SECTION 2: FALSE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS OF
FACT REQUIRED
(a) False Statements of Fact Required
All actions for defamation must be based upon publication of
false defamatory statements of fact of and concerning the plain-
tiff. No action may be based upon statements that are expres-
sions of opinion.
(b) Defamatory Defined
A statement is defamatory if, as reasonably construed, it tends
to injure the plaintiff's reputation.
(c) Question for Court
Whether the statements giving rise to the action are capable of
being reasonably understood as defamatory statements of fact is
initially a question of law to be decided by the court. If the court
determines that the statements are capable of being reasonably
understood as defamatory statements of fact, it shall be for the
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trier-of-fact to determine whether the statements were actually
so understood by recipients of the statements.
(d) Factors to be Considered
In determining whether the statements giving rise to the litiga-
tion are defamatory statements of fact or statements of opinion,
the court and trier-of-fact shall consider:
(1) The extent to which the statements are objectively verifia-
ble or provable;
(2) The extent to which the statements were made in a con-
text in which they were likely to be reasonably understood as
opinion or rhetorical hyperbole and not as statements of fact;
(3) The language used, including its common meaning, and
the extent to which qualifying or cautionary language, or a dis-
claimer, was employed.
SECTION 3: RETRACTION OR REPLY
(a) Request as Prerequisite to Suit
No action for defamation may be brought against any defend-
ant, unless the plaintiff shall allege either:
(1) That the plaintiff made a timely and sufficient request for
a retraction and the defendant failed to make a timely and con-
spicuous retraction; or
(2) That the plaintiff made a timely and sufficient request for
an opportunity to reply, and the defendant failed to provide the
plaintiff with a timely and conspicuous opportunity to reply or
to make a timely and conspicuous retraction;
(3) That the plaintiff made a timely and sufficient request in
the alternative for either a retraction or an opportunity to reply,
and the defendant failed to make either a conspicuous retraction
or provide the plaintiff with a conspicuous and timely opportu-
nity to reply.
(b) Retraction Defined
A retraction is a good faith publication of the facts, withdrawing
and repudiating the prior defamatory statements.
(c) Reply Defined
A reply is the publication of the plaintiff's statement of the
facts.
(d) Timely Request
A timely request for retraction or reply is a request made within
30 days of the publication of the defamatory statements.
(e) Requirements for Request
A request for a retraction or reply must be made in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or his authorized attorney or agent. It
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must specify the statements claimed to be false and defamatory
and must set forth the plaintiff's version of the facts.
(f) Conspicuous Retraction
A conspicuous retraction is a retraction published in substan-
tially.the same place and manner as the defamatory statements
being retracted. The placement and timing of the retraction
must be reasonably calculated to reach the same audience as the
prior defamatory statements being retracted.
(g) Conspicuous Reply
A conspicuous reply is a reply written by the plaintiff and pub-
lished in substantially the same place and manner as the defam-
atory statements to which the reply is directed. In the case of a
broadcast, the defendant may read the reply or permit the plain-
tiff or his designate to read it. The defendant may require that
the reply not exceed the length of the material in which the de-
famatory statements of and concerning the plaintiff were pub-
lished, and that its form reasonably accommodate the nature of
the medium in which it is to be published. The reply must be
concise and limited to rebuttal of the defamatory statements.
(h) Publication of Retraction or Reply in Customarily Desig-
nated Places
When the defendant customarily publishes retractions, correc-
tions or opportunities to reply in a designated place, publication
of a retraction or reply in that place shall be deemed conspicu-
ous if notice of the retraction or reply is published in substan-
tially the same place and manner as the statements to which the
reply or retraction is directed.
(i) Options of Defendant
Upon receipt of a request for a retraction, the defendant may
satisfy the requirements of this Section only by publishing a re-
traction. Upon receipt of a request for an opportunity to reply,
or upon receipt of a request in the alternative for either a retrac-
tion or opportunity to reply, the defendant may satisfy the re-
quirements of this Section by electing either to publish a retrac-
tion or to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to reply.
() Timely Retraction or Reply
To be timely, the publication of a retraction or reply must be
made within 30 days of the request. In the case of a false and a
defamatory statement about a candidate for public office, how-
ever, the retraction or reply shall not be deemed timely unless it
is published within a reasonable time under the circumstances
prior to the election.
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SECTION 4: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
(a) Declaratory Judgment Action Brought by Plaintiff
Subject to the requirements of Section 3, a person who is the
subject of any defamation may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment that such
publication was false and defamatory.
(b) No Damages Permitted
No damages shall be awarded in such an action, and the filing of
such an action for declaratory judgment shall forever bar the
plaintiff from asserting or recovering for any other claim or
cause of action arising out of the publication which is the subject
of the action.
(c) Proof of Fault or State of Mind Not Required
Neither the fault nor state of mind of the defendant shall be an
element of such an action.
(d) Burden of Proof
In any action for a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff shall bear
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
publication was false and defamatory.
(e) Election of Defendant to Convert Action for Damages to
an Action for Declaratory Judgment
A defendant in an action for defamation shall have the right, at
the time of filing its answer or within 20 days from the com-
mencement of the action, whichever comes first, to designate the
action as an action for a declaratory judgment. Any action desig-
nated by the defendant as an action for a declaratory judgment
pursuant to this provision shall be treated for all purposes as if
it had been filed originally as an action for a declaratory judg-
ment by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall be forever barred
from asserting or recovering for any other claim or cause of ac-
tion arising out of the publication which is the subject of such
action.
(f) Docket Priority
Actions for declaratory judgments in defamation cases shall be
granted priority over other civil actions in setting trial dates,
and in all cases must be tried within 120 days of the filing of the
complaint, unless the court makes an explicit finding on the rec-
ord that such an expedited trial date is impracticable under the
circumstances. The court may issue such orders as to discovery




SECTION 5: NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
No cause of action for either a declaratory judgment or damages
may be maintained for the reporting of false and defamatory
statements involving matters of public interest or concern made
by persons or entities other than the defendant if the persons or
entities who made the statements are identified and the state-
ments are accurately reported.
SECTION 6: TRUTH OR FALSITY
(a) Burden of Proof
In any action for defamation, whether for declaratory judgment
or damages, the plaintiff shall bear the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statements of
and concerning the plaintiff are false.
(b) Substantial Truth
The plaintiff shall not be deemed to have met the burden of
proof required by this Section if the defamatory statements are
substantially true.
SECTION 7: MINIMUM FAULT REQUIREMENTS
In all defamation actions for damages, at minimum the plaintiff
shall bear the burden of proving, through clear and convincing




Any cause of action for defamation maintained pursuant to this
Act, whether for a declaratory judgment or for damages, shall be
absolutely barred if the statements were made by:
(1) Judges, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, or other participants
in any judicial proceeding;
(2) Legislators, attorneys, aides, witnesses, or other partici-
pants in any legislative proceeding; or
(3) Executive and administrative officials, attorneys, wit-
nesses, or other participants in any quasi-judicial or quasi-legis-
lative executive or administrative proceeding.
(b) Conditional Privileges Abolished in Declaratory Judg-
ment Actions
All conditional privileges are abolished in actions for declaratory
judgment maintained pursuant to Section 4.
(c) Conditional Privileges in Damages Actions
In actions maintained for damages, the defendant shall be given
a conditional privilege for statements made:
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(1) In the self-defense of the defendant's own legitimate
interests;
(2) In furtherance of the legitimate interests of others;
(3) To protect a common interest between the defendant and
the recipient of the communication; or
(4) To persons officially charged with the duty of acting in the
public interest.
(d) Abuse of Conditional Privilege
No cause of action based upon statements encompassed by a
conditional privilege may be maintained unless the plaintiff
proves that the defendant abused the privilege. The privilege
shall be deemed abused and forfeited if the defendant deliber-
ately communicated the defamatory matter to persons other
than those to whom communication was necessary to serve the
interests giving rise to the privilege. If the communication was
not made to persons other than those necessary to serve the in-
terest giving rise to the privilege, then the privilege shall be
deemed abused and forfeited only if the defendant published
the defamatory statements with the knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for truth or falsity.
SECTION 9: DAMAGES
(a) Libel and Slander Distinctions Abolished
All distinctions among libel, slander, libel per se, libel per quod,
slander per se and slander per quod are abolished.
(b) Recovery Limited to Actual Injury
In any action for damages, recovery shall be limited to reasona-
ble compensation based on proof of actual injury. Presumed
damages are abolished. Proof of special damages (specific, pecu-
niary, out-of-pocket damages) shall not, however, be required.
Proof of damage to reputation is a prerequisite to any recovery
of damages. If proof of reputational injury is established, the
plaintiff may additionally recover damages for personal humilia-
tion, anguish or emotional distress.
(c) All Factors Considered
In awarding compensatory damages for actual injury the trier-
or-fact may take into account all factors relevant to the impact
of the defamatory statement, including whether it was in written
or oral form.
(d) No Punitive Damages




SECTION 10: ATTORNEYS' FEES
(a) In Litigating the Sufficiency of a Retraction or a Reply
The defendant may move to dismiss any action for defamation
on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to comply with the re-
quirements for a request for a retraction or reply set forth in
Section 3, or on the grounds that the defendant either published
a retraction or provided an opportunity to reply, in compliance
with the requirements of Section 3. If the action is so dismissed,
the defendant shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. If the
action is not so dismissed, attorneys' fees shall be awarded as
otherwise provided in this Section.
(b) In Declaratory Judgment Actions
In any action brought as a declaratory judgment or converted to
an action for a declaratory judgment, the court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees. The court shall have
discretion to deny or reduce the award of attorneys' fees to any
prevailing party who litigated vexatious or frivolous claims or
defenses.
(c) In Damages Actions
In any action for damages, each side shall bear its own attor-
neys' fees, subject to the applicable general rules of the jurisdic-
tion for civil litigation.
SECTION 11: LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF ONE YEAR
Any action for defamation must be commenced no later than
one year after the first date of publication.
SECTION 12: SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
An action brought pursuant to this Act shall be the exclusive
remedy for all injury in all jurisdictions arising from the defama-
tory statement upon which the action is based.
SECTION 13: SEVERABILITY
The provisions of this Act are severable, and any judicial deci-
sion declaring any provision of this Act invalid shall not be
deemed to invalidate other provisions of the Act.
SECTION 14: PREEMPTION AND JURISDICTION
Alternative A-Federal Statute
The provisions of this Act shall be preemptive of all applicable
state laws governing defamation or false-light invasion of pri-
vacy. A cause of action pursuant to this Act may be brought in
any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction.
Alternative B-State Statute
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Except as otherwise provided herein, the provisions of this Act
are preemptive of applicable prior law governing defamation or
false-light invasion of privacy. A cause of action pursuant to this
Act may be brought in any state or federal court of competent
jurisdiction.
